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Abstract
We present a differentially private data generation paradigm using random feature
representations of kernel mean embeddings when comparing the distribution of
true data with that of synthetic data. We exploit the random feature representations
for two important benefits. First, we require a very low privacy cost for training
deep generative models. This is because unlike kernel-based distance metrics
that require computing the kernel matrix on all pairs of true and synthetic data
points, we can detach the data-dependent term from the term solely dependent on
synthetic data. Hence, we need to perturb the data-dependent term once-for-all
and then use it until the end of the generator training. Second, we can obtain an
analytic sensitivity of the kernel mean embedding as the random features are norm
bounded by construction. This removes the necessity of hyper-parameter search
for a clipping norm to handle the unknown sensitivity of a generator network. We
provide several variants of our algorithm, differentially-private mean embeddings
with random features (DP-MERF) to jointly generate labels and input features
for datasets such as heterogeneous tabular data and image data. Our algorithm
achieves better privacy-utility trade-offs than existing methods when tested on
several datasets.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) is a gold standard privacy notion that is widely used in many applications
in machine learning. However, due to its composability, every access to data reduces the privacy
guarantee, which limits the number of times to query sensitive data until a desired privacy level is met.
Differentially private data generation solves this problem of limited access by creating a synthetic
dataset that is similar to the true dataset using DP mechanisms. This process also comes at a privacy
cost, but afterwards, the synthetic dataset can be used in place of the true one for unlimited time
without further loss of privacy.
Classical approaches to differentially private data generation typically assume a certain class of
pre-specified queries. These DP algorithms produce a privacy-preserving synthetic database that
is similar to the privacy-sensitive original data for that fixed query class [10, 13, 26, 30]. However,
specifying a query class upfront significantly limits the flexibility of the synthetic data, if data analysts
hope to perform other machine learning tasks.
To overcome this inflexibility, many papers on DP data generation have utilized the recent advances
in deep generative modeling. The majority of these approaches is based on the generative adversarial
networks (GAN) [8] framework, where a discriminator and a generator play a min-max form of
game to optimize a given distance metric between the true and synthetic data distributions. Most
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approaches have used either the Jensen-Shannon divergence [16, 23, 28], or the Wasserstein distance
[6, 27]. For more details on different divergence metrics, see Appendix A.
Another popular choice of distance metric for generative modelling is Maximum Mean Discrepancy
(MMD). MMD compares two probability measures in terms of all possible moments, resulting in no
information loss due to a selection of a certain set of moments. The MMD estimator is in closed form
(eq. 1) and easy to compute by the pair-wise evaluations of a kernel function using the points drawn
from the true and the generated data distributions.
In this work, we propose to use a particular form of MMD via random Fourier feature representations
[17] of kernel mean embeddings for DP data generation. While MMD can be used within a GAN
framework as well (see e.g. [11, 12]) we choose a much simpler method, which is particularly suited
for training with DP constraints. The random feature representations of mean embeddings (eq. 2)
we use as an objective separate the mean embedding of the true data distribution (data-dependent)
from that of the synthetic data distribution (data-independent). Hence, only the data-dependent
term requires privatization. Random features provide an analytic sensitivity of the mean embedding,
which allows us to release a DP version of this embedding through a DP mechanism as we explain
below. With the privatized data embedding and the synthetic data embedding, our objective no longer
directly accesses the data and can be optimized freely to train a data generator. Our contributions are
summarized below.
(1) We provide a simple algorithm for DP data generation, which improves on existing methods
both in privacy and utility.
• Simple to optimize: Our method avoids the cumbersome min-max optimization, which
often results in high cost computations to find the right setup. This exacerbates with more
hyperparameters such as empirical sensitivities present in GAN based approaches. Our
method requires only minimization with a minimal number of hyperparameters1.
• Strong privacy: By requiring only a single DP-release which has an analytic sensitivity, our
method can provide strong DP guarantee more easily than methods which access the data
on each training iteration.
• High utility: Since the objective is already made private, the optimization is not constrained
in any way, which leads to better results. This contrast is particularly stark on MNIST, where
our model at a strong privacy guarantee of (0.2, 10−5)-DP outperforms DP-CGAN with a
weak privacy of (9.6, 10−5)-DP by over 10%.
(2) Our algorithm accommodates several needs in privacy-preserving data generation.
• Generating input and output pairs jointly: We treat both input and output to be privacy-
sensitive. This is different from the conditional-GAN type of methods, where the class
distribution is treated as non-sensitive, which increases the risk of identification, particularly
in imbalanced datasets where some classes contain only a small number of samples.
• Generating imbalanced and heterogeneous tabular data: This is an important condition
for a DP method to be useful, as real world datasets frequently exhibit class-imbalance and
heterogeneity.
We start by describing necessary background information in Sec. 2 before introducing our method in
Sec. 3, followed by an overview of related work in Sec. 4 and experiments in Sec. 5.
2 Background
In the following, we describe the kernel mean embeddings with random features, and introduce
differential privacy, which our model will use in Sec. 3.
1Hyperparameters in our method are the number of random features, a kernel parameter, and the learning
rate.
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2.1 Random feature mean embeddings
Given the samples drawn from two probability distributions: Xm = {xi}mi=1 ∼ P and X ′n ={x′i}ni=1 ∼ Q, the MMD biased estimator is defined as [9]:
M̂MD
2
(Xm, X
′
n) =
1
m2
m∑
i,j=1
k(xi, xj) +
1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
k(x′i, x
′
j)− 2mn
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
k(xi, x
′
j). (1)
The total computational cost of M̂MD(Xm, X ′n) is O(mn), which is prohibitive for large-scale
datasets. A fast linear-time MMD estimator can be achieved by considering an approximation to the
kernel function k(x, x′) with an inner product of finite dimensional feature vectors, i.e., k(x, x′) ≈
φˆ(x)>φˆ(x′) where φˆ(x) ∈ RD and D is the number of features. The resulting approximation of the
MMD estimator given in eq. 1 is
M̂MD
2
rf (P,Q) =
∥∥∥∥ 1m m∑
i=1
φˆ(xi)− 1n
n∑
i=1
φˆ(x′i)
∥∥∥∥2
2
, (2)
which can be computed in O(m + n), i.e., linear in the sample size. One popular approach to
obtaining such φˆ(·) is based on random Fourier features [17] which can be applied to any translation
invariant kernel, i.e., k(x, x′) = k˜(x−x′) for some function k˜. According to Bochner’s theorem [18],
k˜ can be written as k˜(x − x′) = ∫ eiω>(x−x′) dΛ(ω) = Eω∼Λ cos(ω>(x − x′)), where i = √−1
and due to positive-definiteness of k˜, its Fourier transform Λ is nonnegative and can be treated as a
probability measure. By drawing random frequencies {ωi}Di=1 ∼ Λ, where Λ depends on the kernel,
(e.g., a Gaussian kernel k corresponds to normal distribution Λ), k˜(x− x′) can be approximated with
a Monte Carlo average. The vector of random Fourier features is given by
φˆ(x) = (φˆ1(x), . . . , φˆD(x))
> (3)
where each coordinate is defined by
φˆj(x) =
√
2/D cos(ωj
>x),
φˆj+D/2(x) =
√
2/D sin(ω>j x),
for j = 1, · · · , D/2. The approximation error of these random features is studied in [20].
2.2 Differential privacy
Given privacy parameters  ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0, a mechanismM is (, δ)-DP if and only if for all possible
sets of mechanism outputs S and all neighbouring datasets D, D′ differing by a single entry, the
following equation holds:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ (4)
A DP mechanism guarantees a limit on the amount of information revealed about any one individual
in the dataset. Typically this guarantee is achieved by adding randomness to the algorithms’ output.
Let a function h : D 7→ Rp computed on sensitive data D output a p-dimensional vector. We can
add noise to h for privacy, where the level of noise is calibrated to the global sensitivity [5], ∆h,
defined by the maximum difference in terms of L2-norm ||h(D)− h(D′)||2, for neighboring D and
D′ (i.e. differ by one data sample). The Gaussian mechanism that we will use in this paper outputs
h˜(D) = h(D) +N (0, σ2∆2hIp). The perturbed function h˜(D) is (, δ)-DP, where σ is a function of
 and δ.
There are two important properties of DP. The composability theorem [5] states that the strength of
privacy guarantee degrades in a measurable way with repeated use of DP-algorithms. This allows us
to combine the results of different private mechanisms in Sec. 3.1. Furthermore, the post-processing
invariance property [5] tells us that the composition of any arbitrary data-independent mapping with
an (, δ)-DP algorithm is also (, δ)-DP. This ensures that no analysis of the released synthetic data
can yield more information about the real data than our choice of  and δ allow.
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3 Differentially private mean embeddings with random features
We first introduce the DP-MERF algorithm to learn the joint2 distribution over the input features x
and output labels y (either categorical variables in classification, or numerical variables in regression).
The benefit of learning the joint distribution is that we do not need to assume the information on the
output labels to be public. By learning the joint distribution, we keep the ratio of the datapoints across
different classes the same in the generated dataset as in the real dataset. This way our generated
dataset is truthful to the privacy-sensitive original dataset in terms of the distribution over both input
features and output labels.
3.1 DP-MERF for input/output pairs
Suppose a generator Gθ (parameterized by θ) takes a pair of inputs zx, zy drawn from a known
distribution and outputs a pair of samples denoted by x˜θ, y˜θ : Gθ(zx, zy) 7→ (x˜θ, y˜θ). We consider
the following objective function,
M̂MD
2
rf (Px,y, Qx˜θ,y˜θ ) =
∥∥∥∥µ̂Px,y − µ̂Qx,y∥∥∥∥2
F
, (5)
where F denotes the Frobenius norm. This type of joint maximum mean discrepancy was used in
other papers [7, 29].
We compose Px,y = Px|yPy, and the generator accordingly: G = G1 ◦ G2, where G2(zy) 7→ y˜
and G1(zx|y˜) 7→ x˜. Here we consider a kernel from a product of two existing kernels,
k((x,y), (x′,y′)) = kx(x,x′)ky(y,y′), where kx is a kernel for input features and ky is a ker-
nel for output labels. For regression, we could use the Gaussian kernel for both kx and ky. For
classification, we could use the Gaussian kernel for kx and the polynomial kernel with order-1,
ky(y,y
′) = y>y′ + c for one-hot-encoded labels y and some constant c, for instance.3 In this case,
the resulting kernel is also characteristic, forming the corresponding MMD as a metric, as explained
in [21]. We represent the mean embeddings using random features
µ̂Px,y =
1
m
m∑
i=1
fˆ(xi,yi), for true data (6)
µ̂Qx,y =
1
n
n∑
i=1
fˆ(Gθ(zxi , zyi)), for synthetic data
where we define fˆ(xi,yi) := vec(φˆ(xi)f(yi)>), where f(yi) = yi for the order-1 polynomial
kernel and yi is one-hot-encoded. See Appendix B for derivation. As a matrix notation, the random
feature mean embedding in eq. 6 can be also written as µ̂Px,y = [m1, · · · , mC ] ∈ RD×C where
the c’th column is defined by
mc =
1
m
mc∑
i∈cc
φˆ(xi) (7)
where cc is the set of the datapoints that belong to the class c, andmc is the number of those datapoints.
Recall that D is the number of random features. C is the number of classes in the dataset. Notice
that the sum in each column is over the number of instances that belong to the particular class c,
while the divisor is the number of samples in the entire dataset, m. This brings difficulties in learning
with this loss function when classes are highly imbalanced, as for rare classes m can be significantly
larger than the sum of the corresponding column. Hence, for class-imbalanced datasets, we modify
the mean embedding by appropriately weighting it4: µ˜Px,y =
[
1
ω1
m1, · · · , 1ωCmC
]
where the
2Using DP-MERF to learn the distribution over the input features only for unsupervised learning is trivial: it
is sufficient to replace the mean embeddings of the joint distribution with those of the marginal distribution over
the input features.
3The optimal choice of Kernel requires knowledge on the characteristics of the data (see guidelines in
Ch. 4 in [25]). At small data sample sizes, a bad kernel choice will affect the efficiency of the algorithm and
can underestimate MMD if the chosen kernel assigns small weights to the “correct” frequencies at which the
distributions differ. However, with a large enough sample, any characteristic kernel is able to capture such
differences.
4We arrive at this expression if we modify the kernel on the labels by a weighted one, i.e., ky(y,y′) =∑C
c=1
1
ωc
yc
>y′c.
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Algorithm 1 DP-MERF for generating input/output pairs
Require: Dataset D, and a privacy level (, δ)
Ensure: (, δ)-DP input output samples for all classes
Step 1. Given (, δ), compute the privacy parameter σ by the RDP composition in [24] for the
(C + 1) repeated use of the Gaussian mechanism.
Step 2. Privatize the random feature mean embeddings viaMweights andMmc .
Step 3. Train the generator by minimizing eq. 11
vector of weights is defined by
ω = [ω1, · · · , ωC ], (8)
and ωc = mcm . By dividing by the weights, now each column has a similar order of strength regardless
of the number of datapoints belonging to the specific class. Here we privatize the weights ω and each
column mc separately, using the two mechanisms defined below.
Definition 3.1 (Mweights) The mechanism takes a dataset D and computes eq. 8. It outputs the
privatized weights given a privacy parameter σ, the number of classes C and the sensitivity ∆ω ,
ω˜ = ω +N (0, σ2(∆ω)2IC), (9)
Note that privatizing weight vector is analogous to privatizing the mixing coefficients in [15]. If there
is one datapoint’s difference in the neighbouring two datasets, only two elements can differ in the
weight vector, resulting in the sensitivity of ∆ω =
√
2
m . These DP weights become the inputs zy
to the generator for label generation: G2(ω˜) 7→ y˜ to sample the output labels according to the real
dataset.
Definition 3.2 (Mmc ) The mechanism takes a dataset D and computes eq. 7. It outputs the priva-
tized quantity given a privacy parameter σ, the number of random features D and the sensitivity
∆mc ,
m˜c = mc +N (0, σ2(∆mc)2ID) (10)
As the norm of φˆ is bounded by 1, the sensitivity of mc (eq. 7) is ∆mc =
2
m . During the training, we
will need to performMweights once, andMmc as many times as the number of classes. Hence, we
divide our privacy budget into C + 1 compositions of the Gaussian mechanisms. Now the objective
function to minimize is modified to
M̂MD
2
rf (P
DP
x,y , Qx˜θ,y˜θ ) =
∥∥∥∥µ˜DPPx,y − µ̂Qx,y∥∥∥∥2
2
, (11)
where µ˜DPPx,y =
[
1
ω˜1
m˜1, · · · 1ω˜C m˜C
]
. Our algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Note that by privatizing the weights and each column mc separately, we can get the benefit of
sensitivity being on the order of 1/m, rather than on the order of 1/mc where the latter could hamper
the training performance as in highly imbalanced datasets mc can be very small resulting in a high
additive noise variance.
3.2 DP-MERF for heterogeneous data
To handle heterogeneous data consisting of continuous variables denoted by xcon and discrete vari-
ables denoted by xdis, we consider the sum of two existing kernels, k((xcon,xdis), (x′con,x
′
dis)) =
kcon(xcon,x
′
con) + kdis(xdis,x
′
dis), where kcon is a kernel for continuous variables and kdis is a
kernel for discrete variables. Note that this does not mean that we assume independence of the two
types of variables explicitly, for details see Appendix H.
As before, we could use the Gaussian kernel for kcon(xcon,x′con) = φˆ(xcon)
>φˆ(x′con) and a
normalized polynomial kernel with order-1, kdis(xdis,x′dis) =
1
ddis
xdis
>x′dis for one-hot-encoded
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values xdis and the length of xdis being ddis. This normalization is to match the importance of the
two kernels in the resulting mean embeddings. Under these kernels, we can approximate the mean
embeddings using random features
µ̂Px =
1
m
m∑
i=1
hˆ(x(i)con,x
(i)
dis), (12)
where we define hˆ(x(i)con,x
(i)
dis) :=
[
φˆ(x
(i)
con)
1√
ddis
x
(i)
dis
]
from the definition of kernel (See Appendix C
for derivation). In summary, for generating input and output pairs jointly when the input fea-
tures are heterogeneous, we run Algorithm 1 with three changes: (a) redefine fˆ(x,y) in eq. 6 as
vec(hˆ(xcon,xdis)f(y)>); (b) redefinemc in eq. 10 as 1m
∑mc
i∈cc hˆ(xi); and (c) change the sensitivity
of mc to ∆mc =
2
√
2
m (see Appendix F for proof).
4 Related work
There are two categories of prior work that are relevant to ours. The first category is the differentially
private GAN framework and its variants [6, 23, 27, 28]. The core technique of most of these
algorithms is based on DP-SGD, with an exception that [28] is based on the Private Aggregation of
Teacher Ensembles (PATE). Unlike these methods, our method does not involve the difficult task
of finding the equilibrium between the generator and the discriminator. Our method is not limited
to the binary classification problems as in PATE-GAN [28]; nor requires a complicated sensitivity
computation as in DP-GAN [27]. Furthermore, our method can produce input and output pairs jointly
for supervised learning problems. DP-CGAN [23] generates the input features conditioning on the
labels, while it does not learn the distribution over the labels. The only method we are aware of
aiming at generating data for multi-class supervised learning is DP-CGAN, against which we will
compare our method in Sec. 5.
The second category is the framework of kernel methods with differential privacy. [3] proposed to use
the reduced set method in conjunction with random features for sharing DP mean embeddings, but
generative models are not part of their algorithms. [19] also used the random feature representations
of the mean embeddings for the DP distributed data summarization to take into account covariate
shifts.
Table 1: Performance comparison on Tabular datasets. The average over five runs.
Real DP-CGAN DP-GAN DP-MERF DP-MERF
(1, 10−5)-DP (1, 10−5)-DP (1, 10−5)-DP (non-priv)
ROC PRC ROC PRC ROC PRC ROC PRC ROC PRC
adult 0.730 0.639 0.509 0.444 0.511 0.445 0.650 0.564 0.653 0.570
census 0.747 0.415 0.655 0.216 0.529 0.166 0.686 0.358 0.692 0.369
cervical 0.786 0.493 0.519 0.200 0.485 0.183 0.545 0.184 0.896 0.737
credit 0.923 0.874 0.664 0.356 0.435 0.150 0.772 0.637 0.898 0.774
epileptic 0.797 0.617 0.578 0.241 0.505 0.196 0.611 0.340 0.616 0.335
isolet 0.893 0.728 0.511 0.198 0.540 0.205 0.547 0.404 0.733 0.424
F1 F1 F1 F1 F1
covtype 0.643 0.285 0.492 0.467 0.513
intrusion 0.959 0.302 0.251 0.85 0.856
5 Experiments
The experiments present robustness of the method in producing a diverse range of data both in private
and non-private settings. We first train a generator using either DP-MERF or a comparison method,
and obtain synthetic data samples, which we use to train 12 predictive models (see Table 5 in the
Appendix for the models). We then evaluate these trained models using the synthetic data to predict
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the labels of real test data. This evaluation follows [28], but note that hyper-parameters of the 12
models differ because the exact settings used in [28] were not available to us, which means that their
scores are not directly comparable to ours. For comparison, we test DP-CGAN [23], as well as our
own implementation of an ensemble of 10 DP-GANs, where each model generates data for one class.
Our version of DP-GAN differs from [27] in that it uses standard DP-SGD [1] with gradient clipping
rather than weight clipping. The results in [27, 28] could not be reproduced as the released code was
incomplete.
As comparison metrics, we use ROC (area under the receiver operating characteristics curve) and
PRC (area under the precision recall curve) for binary-labeled data. We use F1 score and prediction
accuracy for multiclass-labeled data. As a baseline, we also show the performance of the models
trained with the real training data. All the numbers shown in the tables are the average over 5
independent runs. Due to the space limit, we describe all our experimental details (e.g., architecture
choices for generators, chosen number of random features, etc.) in the Appendix.
Table 2: Tabular datasets. num refers to numerical,
cat refers to categorical, and ord refers to ordinal
variables
dataset # samps # classes # features
isolet 4366 2 617 num
covtype 406698 7 10 num, 44 cat
epileptic 11500 2 178 num
credit 284807 2 29 num
cervical 753 2 11 num, 24 cat
census 199523 2 7 num, 33 cat
adult 22561 2 6 num, 8 cat
intrusion 394021 5 8 cat, 6 ord, 26 num
Heterogeneous tabular data We begin the
experiments with a set of tabular data which
contain real-world information. The datasets we
consider contain either only numerical data (ho-
mogenous) or both numerical and categorical
data (including ordinal data such as education),
which we call heterogenous datasets. The nu-
merical features which are both discrete and
continuous values. The categorical features can
have two classes (e.g. whether a person smokes
or not) or several classes (e.g. country of ori-
gin). The output labels are also categorical; we
include datasets with both binary and multiclass
labels. Table 2 summarizes the datasets. Ta-
ble 1 shows the average across the 12 predictive
models trained by the generated samples from
DP-CGAN, DP-GAN and DP-MERF. Results for the individual models can be found in Appendix
K. DP-MERF produces high-quality samples which are only a few percentage points short of the
real-world data. The method works well both with numerical and categorical data. In the private
setting, we perturb the mean embedding of the true data once using Algorithm 1, resulting in a
relatively small drop in evaluation metrics.
Image data For image datasets, MNIST and FashionMNIST, two changes are made to the training
procedure of DP-MERF generators. Firstly, as the datasets in question are almost perfectly balanced,
we assume that the label distribution is uniform instead of learning it. Secondly, the generator
architecture is changed to include convolutional layers, alternating with bilinear upsampling, to take
advantage of the inherent structure of image data.
Table 3: Test accuracy on image data. In all cases δ = 10−5.
Real DP-CGAN DP-GAN DP-MERF DP-MERF DP-MERF
 = 9.6  = 9.6  =∞  = 1  = 0.2
MNIST 0.87 0.50 0.48 0.65 0.65 0.61
FashionMNIST 0.78 0.39 0.46 0.61 0.62 0.53
Table 3 compares the real data prediction performance based generated training sets using all three
models. Results are averaged over 12 classifiers. It shows that DP-MERF outperforms the GAN
based methods by a wide margin and maintains good performance under more meaningful privacy
constraints of (1, 10−5)-DP and (0.2, 10−5)-DP. Looking at the generated samples of the three tested
methods in Fig. 1, we see that the samples from DP-MERF at  = 0.2 are noisier than those of
DP-CGAN, while still achieving higher downstream accuracy. This indicates that the distinctive
features of the data are preserved despite the noisy appearance of the DP-MERF samples. In addition,
a difference in sample diversity may be responsible.
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Data Samples DP-CGAN ( = 9.6) DP-MERF ( = 1) DP-MERF ( = 0.2)
Figure 1: Generated samples with different levels of privacy
(a) digit MNIST (b) fashion MNIST
Figure 2: Test accuracy of classifiers trained on synthetic datasets of varying size. Scores are averaged
over 12 models and 5 random seeds. Confidence intervals denote ±1 standard deviation.
Sample diversity We investigate how diverse the generated data samples are in DP-MERF and
DP-CGAN. For quantifying the diversity, we trained models using generated datasets of varying
size from 60 to 60.000 samples and comparing the accuracy classifiers trained on these datasets. In
Fig. 2 (Left for MNIST digits), we see that all models show the increase in accuracy as we increase
the number of sample size from 60 to 12K. However, more than 12K samples, we do not see any
increase in the classification accuracy, indicating the lack of diversity from this size on. On the other
hand, in Fig. 2 (Right for Fashion-MNIST), this exacerbates as the complexity of data increases. The
take-away message from this evaluation is that the models we tested including ours need to improve
to be able to faithfully express the inherent complexity and the diversity of the data.
6 Summary and Discussion
We proposed a simple and practical algorithm using the random feature representation of kernel mean
embeddings for DP data generation. Our method requires a significantly lower privacy budget to
produce quality data samples compared to GAN based approaches, tested on 8 tabular datasets and 2
image datasets. The metrics we used were targeting at supervised learning tasks, but the method is
not limited to this application. In future work, we plan to evaluate our method on a more diverse set
of tasks and expand it, to scale to more complex data.
References
[1] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. “Deep
Learning with Differential Privacy”. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security. CCS ’16. New York, NY, USA: Association for
Computing Machinery, 2016, pp. 308–318.
8
[2] M. Arjovsky, S. Chintala, and L. Bottou. “Wasserstein GAN”. In: ArXiv abs/1701.07875
(2017).
[3] M. Balog, I. Tolstikhin, and B. Schölkopf. “Differentially Private Database Release via Ker-
nel Mean Embeddings”. In: Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML). Vol. 80. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research. PMLR, July 2018,
pp. 423–431.
[4] I. Csiszár and P. Shields. “Information Theory and Statistics: A Tutorial”. In: Foundations and
Trends R© in Communications and Information Theory 1.4 (2004), pp. 417–528.
[5] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor. “Our Data, Ourselves:
Privacy Via Distributed Noise Generation.” In: Eurocrypt. Vol. 4004. Springer. 2006, pp. 486–
503.
[6] L. Frigerio, A. S. de Oliveira, L. Gomez, and P. Duverger. “Differentially Private Generative
Adversarial Networks for Time Series, Continuous, and Discrete Open Data”. In: ICT Systems
Security and Privacy Protection - 34th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2019,
Lisbon, Portugal, June 25-27, 2019, Proceedings. 2019, pp. 151–164.
[7] H. Gao and H. Huang. “Joint Generative Moment-Matching Network for Learning Structural
Latent Code”. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-18. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Organization, July 2018, pp. 2121–2127.
[8] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu, D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville,
and Y. Bengio. “Generative Adversarial Nets”. In: Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems 27. Ed. by Z. Ghahramani, M. Welling, C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, and K. Q.
Weinberger. Curran Associates, Inc., 2014, pp. 2672–2680.
[9] A. Gretton, K. M. Borgwardt, M. J. Rasch, B. Schölkopf, and A. Smola. “A kernel two-sample
test”. In: Journal of Machine Learning Research 13.Mar (2012), pp. 723–773.
[10] M. Hardt, K. Ligett, and F. Mcsherry. “A Simple and Practical Algorithm for Differentially
Private Data Release”. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25. Ed. by
F. Pereira, C. J. C. Burges, L. Bottou, and K. Q. Weinberger. Curran Associates, Inc., 2012,
pp. 2339–2347.
[11] C.-L. Li, W.-C. Chang, Y. Cheng, Y. Yang, and B. Poczos. “MMD GAN: Towards Deeper
Understanding of Moment Matching Network”. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 30. Ed. by I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan,
and R. Garnett. Curran Associates, Inc., 2017, pp. 2203–2213.
[12] C.-L. Li, W.-C. Chang, Y. Cheng, Y. Yang, and B. Póczos. “MMD GAN: Towards Deeper
Understanding of Moment Matching Network”. In: Proceedings of the 31st International
Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. NIPS’17. Red Hook, NY, USA: Curran
Associates Inc., 2017, pp. 2200–2210.
[13] N. Mohammed, R. Chen, B. C. Fung, and P. S. Yu. “Differentially Private Data Release for Data
Mining”. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining. KDD ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 493–501.
[14] S. Nowozin, B. Cseke, and R. Tomioka. “f-GAN: Training Generative Neural Samplers Using
Variational Divergence Minimization”. In: Proceedings of the 30th International Conference
on Neural Information Processing Systems. NIPS’16. USA: Curran Associates Inc., 2016,
pp. 271–279.
[15] M. Park, J. Foulds, K. Choudhary, and M. Welling. “DP-EM: Differentially Private Expectation
Maximization”. In: Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
and Statistics. Ed. by A. Singh and J. Zhu. Vol. 54. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.
Fort Lauderdale, FL, USA: PMLR, Apr. 2017, pp. 896–904.
[16] N. Park, M. Mohammadi, K. Gorde, S. Jajodia, H. Park, and Y. Kim. “Data Synthesis Based on
Generative Adversarial Networks”. In: Proc. VLDB Endow. 11.10 (June 2018), pp. 1071–1083.
[17] A. Rahimi and B. Recht. “Random features for large-scale kernel machines”. In: Advances in
neural information processing systems. 2008, pp. 1177–1184.
[18] W. Rudin. Fourier Analysis on Groups: Interscience Tracts in Pure and Applied Mathematics,
No. 12. English. Literary Licensing, LLC, 2013.
9
[19] K. Sarpatwar, K. Shanmugam, V. S. Ganapavarapu, A. Jagmohan, and R. Vaculin. “Differen-
tially Private Distributed Data Summarization under Covariate Shift”. In: Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems. 2019, pp. 14432–14442.
[20] D. J. Sutherland and J. Schneider. “On the Error of Random Fourier Features”. In: Proceedings
of the Thirty-First Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. UAI’15. Arlington,
Virginia, USA: AUAI Press, 2015, pp. 862–871.
[21] Z. Szabó and B. K. Sriperumbudur. “Characteristic and Universal Tensor Product Kernels”. In:
Journal of Machine Learning Research 18.233 (2018), pp. 1–29.
[22] I. Tolstikhin, O. Bousquet, S. Gelly, and B. Schoelkopf. “Wasserstein Auto-Encoders”. In:
International Conference on Learning Representations. 2018.
[23] R. Torkzadehmahani, P. Kairouz, and B. Paten. “DP-CGAN: Differentially Private Synthetic
Data and Label Generation”. In: The IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR) Workshops. June 2019.
[24] Y.-X. Wang, B. Balle, and S. P. Kasiviswanathan. “Subsampled Renyi Differential Privacy
and Analytical Moments Accountant”. In: Proceedings of Machine Learning Research. Ed. by
K. Chaudhuri and M. Sugiyama. Vol. 89. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research. PMLR,
Apr. 2019, pp. 1226–1235.
[25] C. K. Williams and C. E. Rasmussen. Gaussian processes for machine learning. Vol. 2. 3. MIT
press Cambridge, MA, 2006.
[26] Y. Xiao, L. Xiong, and C. Yuan. “Differentially Private Data Release through Multidimensional
Partitioning”. In: Secure Data Management. Ed. by W. Jonker and M. Petkovic´. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 150–168.
[27] L. Xie, K. Lin, S. Wang, F. Wang, and J. Zhou. “Differentially Private Generative Adversarial
Network”. In: CoRR abs/1802.06739 (2018). arXiv: 1802.06739.
[28] J. Yoon, J. Jordon, and M. van der Schaar. “PATE-GAN: Generating Synthetic Data with
Differential Privacy Guarantees”. In: International Conference on Learning Representations.
2019.
[29] Y.-Y. Zhang, C.-M. Shen, H. Feng, P. T. Fletcher, and G.-X. Zhang. “Generative Adversarial
Networks with Joint Distribution Moment Matching”. In: Journal of the Operations Research
Society of China 7.4 (Dec. 2019), pp. 579–597.
[30] T. Zhu, G. Li, W. Zhou, and P. S. Yu. “Differentially Private Data Publishing and Analysis:
A Survey”. In: IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 29.8 (Aug. 2017),
pp. 1619–1638.
10
Appendix:
Differentially Private Random Feature Mean
Embeddings for Synthetic Data Generation
A Background on distance measures for DP data generation
Many recent papers on DP data generation have utilized the generative adversarial networks (GAN)
[8] framework, where a discriminator and a generator play a min-max form of game to optimize
for the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the true and synthetic data distributions [16, 23, 28].
The Jensen-Shannon divergence belongs to the family of divergence, known as Ali-Silvey distance,
Csiszár’s φ-divergence [4], defined as Dφ(P,Q) =
∫
M
φ
(
P
Q
)
dQ where M is a measurable space
and P,Q are probability distributions. Depending on the form of φ, Dφ(P,Q) recovers popular
divergences5 such as the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence (φ(t) = t log t).
Another popular family of distance measure is integral probability metrics (IPMs), which is defined
by D(P,Q) = supf∈F
∣∣∫
M
fdP − ∫
M
fdQ
∣∣ where F is a class of real-valued bounded measurable
functions on M . Depending on the class of functions, there are several popular choices of IPMs. For
instance, when F = {f : ‖f‖L ≤ 1}, where ‖f‖L := sup{|f(x) − f(y)|/ρ(x, y) : x 6= y ∈ M}
for a metric space (M,ρ), D(P,Q) yields the Kantorovich metric, and when M is separable, the
Kantorovich metric recovers the Wasserstein distance, a popular choice for generative modelling
such as Wasserstein-GAN and Wasserstein-VAE [2, 22]. The GAN framework with the Wasserstein
distance was also used for DP data generation [6, 27].
As another example of IPMs, when F = {f : ‖f‖H ≤ 1}, i.e., the function class is a unit ball in
reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) H associated with a positive-definite kernel k, D(P,Q)
yields the maximum mean discrepancy (MMD), MMD(P,Q) = supf∈F
∣∣∫
M
fdP − ∫
M
fdQ
∣∣.
In this case finding a supremum is analytically tractable and the solution is represented by the
difference in the mean embeddings of each probability measure: MMD(P,Q) = ‖µP − µQ‖H ,
where µP = Ex∼P[k(x, ·)] and µQ = Ey∼Q[k(y, ·)]. For a characteristic kernel k, the squared MMD
forms a metric, i.e., MMD2 = 0, if and only if P = Q. MMD is also a popular choice for generative
modelling in the GAN frameworks [11, 12], as MMD compares two probability measures in terms of
all possible moments (no information loss due to a selection of a certain set of moments); and the
MMD estimator is in closed form (eq. 1) and easy to compute by the pair-wise evaluations of a kernel
function using the points drawn from P and Q.
In this work, we propose to use a particular form of MMD via random Fourier feature representations
[17] of kernel mean embeddings for DP data generation.
B Derivation of feature maps for a product of two kernels
Under our assumption, we decompose the kernel below into two kernels:
k((x,y), (x′,y′))
= kx(x,x
′)ky(y,y′), product of two kernels
≈
[
φˆ(x′)>φˆ(x)
] [
f(y)>f(y′)
]
, random features for kernel kx
= Tr
(
φˆ(x′)>φˆ(x)f(y)>f(y′)
)
,
= vec(φˆ(x′)f(y′)>)>vec(φˆ(x)f(y)>) = fˆ(x′,y′)>fˆ(x,y)
5See Table 1 in [14] for various φ divergences in the context of GANs.
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C Derivation of feature maps for a sum of two kernels
Under our assumption, we compose the kernel below from the sum of two kernels:
k((xcon,xdis), (x
′
con,x
′
dis))
= kcon(xcon,x
′
con) + kdis(xdis,x
′
dis),
≈ φˆ(xcon)>φˆ(x′con) + 1√ddisxdis
>x′dis,
=
[
φˆ(xcon)
1√
ddis
xdis
]T [
φˆ(xcon)
1√
ddis
xdis
]
= hˆ(xcon,xdis)
T hˆ(xcon,xdis).
D Sensitivity of weights
Recall that the weights are defined by ω = [ω1, · · · , ωC ], where each element is ωc = mcm . Here
mc is the number of datapoints that belong to class c and m is the total number of datapoints in the
training data, i.e.,
∑C
i=1mi = m.
When there are two datapoints’ difference (denote those datapoints by xi,x′i) in two neighbouring
datasets, there will be two classes that are affected by the two datapoints. Below, without loss of
generality, we assume two datapoints difference appears in mC and m2.
The sensitivity of ω is
∆ω = maxD,D′
‖ω(D)− ω(D′)‖2 ,
= max
xi,x′i
1
m
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 m1m2· · ·
mC(xi)
−
 m1m′2(x′i)· · ·
m′C

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
= max
xi,x′i
1
m
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 0m2 −m′2(x′i)· · ·
mC(xi)−m′C

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
= max
xi,x′i
1
m
√
|m2 −m′2(x′i)|2 + |mC(xi)−m′C |2,
=
√
2
m
(13)
where the last line is due to maxx′i |m2 −m′2(x′i)| = 1 and maxxi |mC(xi)−m′C | = 1.
E Sensitivity of µc with homogeneous data
The sensitivity of mc is
∆mc = maxD,D′
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
mc∑
i∈cc
φˆ(xi)− 1m
mc∑
i∈cc
φˆ(x′i)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
= max
xi,x′i
∥∥∥ 1m φˆ(xi)− 1m φˆ(x′i)∥∥∥ ,
≤ max
xi
2
m
∥∥∥φˆ(xi)∥∥∥
2
, (14)
≤ 2m , (15)
where the list line is because
∥∥∥φˆ(xi)∥∥∥
2
≤ 1.
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F Sensitivity of µc with heterogeneous data
Recall that hˆ(x(i)con,x
(i)
dis) =
[
φˆ(x
(i)
con)
1√
ddis
x
(i)
dis
]
and mc = 1m
∑mc
i∈cc hˆ(xi) where xi is the concatenation
of x(i)con and x
(i)
dis. The sensitivity of mc, assuming that two datasets differ at the n-th datapoint, is
∆mc = maxD,D′
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
mc∑
i∈cc
hˆ(xi)− 1m
mc∑
i∈cc
hˆ(x′i)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
= max
xn,x′n
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
[
φˆ(x
(n)
con)
1√
ddis
x
(n)
dis
]
− 1m
[
φˆ(x′(n)con)
1√
ddis
x′(n)dis
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
≤ max
xn
2
m
∥∥∥∥∥
[
φˆ(x
(n)
con)
1√
ddis
x
(n)
dis
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
≤ max
x
(n)
dis
2
m
√√√√1 + 1ddis ddis∑
j=1
(x
(n)
dis,j)
2, since‖φˆ(·)‖2 = 1
≤ 2
√
2
m
, (16)
where the list line is because xdis is a vector of binary variables.
G Sensitivity of µ̂Px,y for image data
Using the product of two kernels
∆µ̂Px,y
= max
D,D′
∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
m∑
i=1
fˆ(xi,yi)− 1m
m∑
i=1
fˆ(x′i,y
′
i)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
= max
xn,x′n
∥∥[0 · · · 1m φˆ(xn) · · · 1m φˆ(x′n) · · ·0]∥∥
where only two columns are non-zero, as there are only two datapoints difference in two datasets
if the labels of these two points are different. As the random features are norm bounded (by 1), the
sensitivity is
√
2
m . On the other hand, if the labels of those two points are the same, only one column is
non-zero, where the value is 1m φˆ(xn)− 1m φˆ(x′n). Hence, the sensitivity is 2m . Therefore the worse
case upper bound among these two cases is ∆µ̂Pg,y =
2
m .
H Variables in heterogeneous data are not treated as independent
While the impression may arise, our method does not assume independence between the continuous
and the discrete variables and models correlations between the two types of variables implicitly.
With the sum of two kernels, the embedding is a concatenation of the two: [Exφx(x), Eyφy(y)],
where Ex means expectation wrt p(x) and Ey is wrt p(y). To compute p(x), we need p(y) with
which we marginalize out y, as p(x) =
∫
p(x, y)dy. This marginalization implicitly takes into
account the correlation between the two. This is less explicit than the case using the product of two
kernels. However, the sum kernel is chosen for computational tractability: a sum kernel in Fourier
representation has dx + dy features while a product kernel has dx · dy .
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I Rényi differential privacy
Definition I.1 (α-Rényi Divergence) For two probability distributions P,Q that have the same
support, the α Rényi divergence is
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 logEx∼Q(x)
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α
(17)
for α ∈ (1,∞).
J Implementation details
Our implementation, including used hyper-parameters and instructions for reproducing the experi-
ments, will be made available upon publication. Please contact the authors for access to the code
before then.
K Heterogeneous and homogenous tabular data
In this section we describe the tabular datasets we have used in our experiments with their respective
sources. We include the details of data preprocessing in case it was performed on a dataset. The
datasets in this form were used in all our experiments as well as the experiments on the benchmark
methods.
Credit
Credit card fraud detection dataset contains the categorized information of credit card transactions
which were either fraudelent or not. Ten dataset comes from a Kaggle competition and is available at
the source, https://www.kaggle.com/mlg-ulb/creditcardfraud. The original data
has 284807 examples, of which negative samples are 284315 and positive 492. The dataset has 31
categories, 30 numerical features and a binary label. We used all but the first feature (Time).
Epileptic
Epileptic dataset describes brain activity with numerical features being EEG recording at a different
point in time. The dataset comes from the UCI database, https://archive.ics.uci.edu/
ml/datasets/Epileptic+Seizure+Recognition. It contains 11500 data points, and
179 categories, 178 features and a label. The original dataset contains five different labels which
we binarize into two states, seizure or no seizure. Thus, there are 9200 negative samples and 2300
positive samples.
Census
The dataset can be downloaded by means of SDGym package, https://pypi.org/project/
sdgym/. The dataset has 199523 examples, 187141 are negative and 12382 are positive. There are
40 categories and a binary label. This dataset contains 7 numerical and 33 categorical features.
Intrusion
The dataset was used for The Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools
Competition held at the Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 1999, and can
be found at http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html. We
used the file, kddcup.data_10_percent.gz. It is a multi-class dataset with five labels describing
different types of connection intrusions. The labels were first grouped into five categories and due to
few examples, we restricted the data to the top four categories.
Adult
The dataset contains information about people’s attributes and their respective income which has been
thresholded and binarized. It has 8049 examples, and 177 features and a binary label. The dataset can
be downloaded by means of SDGym package,https://pypi.org/project/sdgym/.
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Isolet
The dataset contains sound features to predict a spoken letter of alphabet. The inputs are sound
features and the output is a latter. We binaried the labels into two classes, consonants and vowels.
The dataset can be found at https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/isolet
Cervical
This dataset is created with the goal to identify the risk factors associated with cervical cancer. It is
the smallest dataset with 858 instances, and 35 attributes, of which The data can be found at 15 are
numerical 24 are categorical (binary). The dataset can be found at https://archive.ics.uci.
edu/ml/datasets/Cervical+cancer+%28Risk+Factors%29. The data, however, con-
tains missing data. We followed the pre-processing suggested at https://www.kaggle.com/
saflynn/cervical-cancer-lynn and further removed the data with the most missing values
and replaced the rest with the category mean value.
Covtype
The dataset describes forest cover type from cartographic variables. The data can be found at
https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/covertype. It contains 53 attributes
and a multi-class label with 7 classes of forest cover types.
K.1 The training
We provide here the details of training procedure. Some of the datasets are very imbalanced, that is
they contain much more examples with one label over the others. In attempt of making categories
more balanced, we undersampled the class with the largest number of samples. The complexity of a
dataset also determined the number of Fourier features we used. We also varied the batch size (we
include the fraction of dataset used in a batch), and the number of epochs in the training. We provide
the detailed parameter settings for each of the dataset in the following table.
Table 4: Parameters settings for training tabular datasets
non-private private
# mini-batch # Fourier # mini-batch # Fourier undersampling
epochs size features epochs size features rate
adult 8000 0.1 50 000 8000 0.1 1000 0.4
census 200 0.5 10 000 2000 0.5 10 000 0.4
cervical 2000 0.6 2000 200 0.5 2000 1
credit 4000 0.6 50 000 4000 0.5 5000 0.005
epileptic 6000 0.5 100 000 6000 0.5 80 000 1
isolet 4000 0.6 100 000 4000 0.5 500 1
covtype 6000 0.05 1000 6000 0.05 1000 0.03
intrusion 10 000 0.03 2000 10 000 0.03 2000 0.1
K.2 Detailed results for binary class dataset
In the main text we included the details for a multi-class dataset and here we also include the results
across all the classification methods for a binary dataset in Table 5 and Table 6. We also include
the best and average F1-score over five runs for the respective classification methods in Table 7 and
Table 8. Notice that this average corresponds to the average reported in Table 1 in the main text.
15
Table 5: Performance comparison on Credit dataset. The highest performance in five runs.
Real DP-CGAN DP-MERF DP-CGAN DP-MERF
(non-priv) (non-priv) (1, 10−5)-DP (1, 10−5)-DP
ROC PRC ROC PRC ROC PRC ROC PRC ROC PRC
Logistic Regression 0.95 0.91 0.83 0.37 0.92 0.79 0.74 0.52 0.78 0.61
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.90 0.80 0.85 0.39 0.92 0.76 0.80 0.55 0.65 0.48
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.89 0.84 0.58 0.19 0.89 0.82 0.67 0.42 0.90 0.74
Linear SVM 0.92 0.89 0.84 0.48 0.91 0.65 0.78 0.45 0.64 0.38
Decision Tree 0.91 0.82 0.74 0.32 0.92 0.69 0.58 0.22 0.72 0.58
LDA 0.87 0.82 0.86 0.53 0.82 0.68 0.58 0.24 0.69 0.51
Adaboost 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.51 0.93 0.85 0.62 0.32 0.75 0.63
Bagging 0.91 0.84 0.79 0.42 0.91 0.79 0.57 0.21 0.74 0.61
Random Forest 0.93 0.90 0.82 0.54 0.92 0.86 0.63 0.31 0.75 0.62
GBM 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.54 0.94 0.85 0.58 0.22 0.74 0.61
Multi-layer perceptron 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.47 0.91 0.74 0.78 0.55 0.66 0.44
XGBoost 0.94 0.91 0.81 0.49 0.94 0.87 0.70 0.53 0.72 0.59
Average 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.44 0.91 0.78 0.67 0.38 0.73 0.57
Table 6: Performance comparison on Credit dataset. The average performance over five runs.
DP-MERF DP-MERF
(non-private) (private)
ROC PRC ROC PRC
Logistic Regression 0.919 0.808 0.796 0.665
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.898 0.725 0.729 0.582
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.879 0.791 0.752 0.586
Linear SVM 0.876 0.667 0.742 0.549
Decision Tree 0.901 0.700 0.775 0.650
LDA 0.838 0.697 0.725 0.544
Adaboost 0.912 0.828 0.787 0.689
Bagging 0.909 0.805 0.811 0.709
Random Forest 0.911 0.840 0.786 0.686
GBM 0.917 0.812 0.807 0.707
Multi-layer perceptron 0.905 0.777 0.747 0.570
XGBoost 0.915 0.837 0.812 0.716
Average 0.898 0.774 0.772 0.638
Table 7: Performance comparison on Intrusion dataset. The highest performance in five runs.
Real DP-CGAN DP-MERF DP-CGAN DP-MERF
(non-priv) (non-priv) (1, 10−5)-DP (1, 10−5)-DP
Logistic Regression 0.948 0.710 0.926 0.567 0.940
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.757 0.503 0.804 0.215 0.736
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.927 0.693 0.822 0.475 0.755
Linear SVM 0.983 0.639 0.922 0.915 0.937
Decision Tree 0.999 0.496 0.862 0.153 0.952
LDA 0.990 0.224 0.910 0.652 0.950
Adaboost 0.947 0.898 0.924 0.398 0.503
Bagging 1.000 0.499 0.914 0.519 0.956
Random Forest 1.000 0.497 0.941 0.676 0.943
GBM 0.999 0.501 0.924 0.255 0.933
Multi-layer perceptron 0.997 0.923 0.933 0.733 0.957
XGBoost 0.999 0.886 0.921 0.751 0.933
Average 0.962 0.622 0.900 0.526 0.875
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Table 8: Performance comparison on Intrusion dataset. The average performance as F1 score over
five runs.
DP-MERF DP-MERF
(non-private) (private)
Logistic Regression 0.891 0.928
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.845 0.792
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.454 0.508
Linear SVM 0.890 0.917
Decision Tree 0.911 0.907
LDA 0.859 0.925
Adaboost 0.899 0.592
Bagging 0.926 0.922
Random Forest 0.904 0.923
GBM 0.901 0.926
Multi-layer perceptron 0.898 0.941
XGBoost 0.891 0.921
Average 0.856 0.850
L Image data
L.1 Datasets
Both digit and fashion MNIST datasets are loaded through the torchvision package and used without
further preprocessing. Both datasets of size 60000 consist of samples from 10 classes, which are
close to perfectly balanced. Each sample is a 28x28 pixel image and thus of significantly higher
dimensionality than the tabular data we tested.
L.2 Detailed results
A detailed version of the results summarized in Table 3 of the paper are shown below, for digit
MNIST is Table 9 and fashion MNIST in Table 10. All scores are the average of 5 independent runs
of training a generator and evaluating the synthetic data it produced. The tables show that DP-MERF
consistently outperforms the other approaches across models. The only exceptions are decision trees
gradient boosting and bagging, where all three models perform poorly but others do slightly better.
Table 9: Test accuracy on digit MNIST data. Average over 5 runs (data generation & model training
Real DP-CGAN DP-GAN DP-MERF DP-MERF DP-MERF
 = 9.6  = 9.6  =∞  = 1  = 0.2
Logistic Regression 0.930 0.600 0.702 0.772 0.769 0.772
Random Forest 0.969 0.638 0.538 0.714 0.685 0.702
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.560 0.310 0.364 0.527 0.545 0.539
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.840 0.610 0.702 0.746 0.750 0.780
Linear SVM 0.920 0.550 0.700 0.756 0.746 0.726
Decision Tree 0.880 0.340 0.255 0.443 0.456 0.346
LDA 0.879 0.590 0.694 0.789 0.793 0.753
Adaboost 0.729 0.254 0.159 0.441 0.456 0.362
MLP 0.978 0.564 0.652 0.807 0.807 0.768
Bagging 0.928 0.430 0.282 0.624 0.602 0.508
GBM 0.909 0.460 0.205 0.678 0.659 0.552
XGBoost 0.912 0.614 0.459 0.525 0.555 0.509
Average 0.870 0.500 0.476 0.652 0.652 0.610
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Table 10: Test accuracy on fashion MNIST data. Average over 5 runs (data generation & model
training
Real DP-CGAN DP-GAN DP-MERF DP-MERF DP-MERF
 = 9.6  = 9.6  =∞  = 1  = 0.2
Logistic Regression 0.844 0.461 0.626 0.725 0.728 0.714
Random Forest 0.875 0.482 0.573 0.657 0.684 0.553
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.585 0.286 0.149 0.598 0.575 0.467
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.648 0.497 0.592 0.602 0.604 0.629
Linear SVM 0.839 0.389 0.613 0.685 0.684 0.697
Decision Tree 0.790 0.315 0.317 0.433 0.462 0.352
LDA 0.799 0.490 0.638 0.735 0.733 0.701
Adaboost 0.561 0.217 0.224 0.291 0.359 0.258
MLP 0.879 0.459 0.601 0.739 0.738 0.696
Bagging 0.841 0.309 0.410 0.576 0.593 0.372
GBM 0.834 0.331 0.254 0.626 0.624 0.429
XGBoost 0.826 0.489 0.478 0.596 0.610 0.445
Average 0.780 0.390 0.457 0.605 0.616 0.526
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